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Abstract
The paper contains a survey of (mainly unpublished) adaptive logics
of inductive generalization. These defeasible logics are precise formula-
tions of certain methods. Some attention is also paid to ways of handling
background knowledge, introducing mere conjectures, and the research
guiding capabilities of the logics.
1 Aim of this paper
This paper describes a variety of adaptive logics of inductive generalization. By
a logic I obviously mean a mapping L : ℘(W) → ℘(W), in which W is the set
of closed formulas of the standard predicative language L. There is a further
requirement for L to be a logic: the selection of CnL(Γ) must be justified by
logical means. Moreover, if the logic is to be a formal one, CnL(Γ) must be
selected in view of Γ by a formal criterion.
The logics are not a contribution to the tradition of Carnapian inductive
logic—see for example [14, Ch. 4]. They are logics of inductive generalization in
the most straightforward sense of the term, logics that from a set of empirical
data and possibly a set of background generalizations lead to a set of gener-
alizations and their consequences. They operate in a purely qualitative way,
first because of the restriction to the language, which prevents one to express
statistical hypotheses, and next because the logics proceed in terms of the types
of data that are available, while the number of data of each type plays no role.
The logics have a proof theory and a semantics. They are characterized in a
formally decent way, their metatheory may be phrased in precise terms,1 and,
most importantly, they aim at explicating people’s actual reasoning towards
inductive generalizations.
∗Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from
the Fund for Scientific Research (FWO). Part of the materials of the present paper rely on
joined research with Lieven Haesaert, Mathieu Beirlaen, and Frederik Van De Putte. Pieter
Robberechts wrote a set of computer programs that offered invaluable help and furthered
theoretic insights as well.
1The metatheory cannot be included here. It is available partly in [6] and more generally
in [9], of which seven chapters are available on the internet at the moment I am writing this.
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The adaptive logics are formally stringent formulations of inductive methods,
whence there should be many. The logics may be given several interpretations.
One would be that the derived generalizations and predictions are provisionally
accepted as true. On a different interpretation, the generalizations are selected
for further testing in the sense of Popper.
To simplify the picture, I shall take CL (Classical Logic) to be the standard
of deduction and shall neglect inconsistent data as well as inconsistent theories.
Even with this restriction, three problems have to be considered. The first con-
cerns the transition from a set of empirical data to inductive generalizations.
Only by taking this step, we may hope to get a grasp on the world—to un-
derstand the world and to act in it. This is handled by the logics of inductive
generalization. The consequences follow from the premises either deductively,
by CL, or inductively. The interesting consequences are obviously the inductive
ones. These comprise, first and foremost, empirical generalizations. They also
comprise deductive consequences of the premises and of the generalizations,
including singular statements that may serve the purposes of prediction and
explanation.
The second problem is that, in order to make the enterprise realistic, data
have to be combined with background knowledge before moving to generaliza-
tions. I shall show that this different problem may also be solved by means
of adaptive logics. The third problem, finally, is that scientists often launch
conjectures that cannot be justified on logical grounds. We shall see that the
logics of inductive generalization indicate which choices may be made. Different
adaptive logics guide the introduction of the conjectures and make the process
defeasible.
It is well known that induction runs into trouble if relational predicates
are considered. These allow one to push the whole history of the world into
the present properties of an object. So I shall restrict the attention to unary
predicates. First problems have to be solved first. There will be further re-
strictions. By a primitive functional formula of rank 1, I shall mean an open
formula that does not contain any logical symbols, sentential letters, or in-
dividual constants, and that contains only predicative letters of rank 1. Let
Af1, the set of functional atoms of rank 1, comprise the primitive functional
formulas of rank 1 and their negations. By a generalization I shall hence-
forth mean the universal closure of a disjunction of members of Af1, formally
{∀(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) | A1, . . . , An ∈ Af1;n ≥ 1}, in which ∀ obviously denotes
the universal closure of the subsequent formula. Actually, that identity would
be allowed to occur in members of Af1 would not make a significant differ-
ence. The absence of sentential letters, individual constants, and quantifiers
in generalizations was already justified in [3]. Incidentally, all (thus restricted)
generalizations are equivalent to formulas of the form ∀((B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn) ⊃ C1)
and hence also to formulas of the form ∀((B1 ∧ . . .∧Bn) ⊃ (C1 ∨ . . .∨Cm)), in
which all Bi and Ci belong to Af1. For some logics introduced in subsequent
sections, it would not make any difference that universal closures of other truth-
functions of members of Af1 were counted as generalizations. The advantage of
the present convention is that it provides a unifying framework.
When working on inductive generalization, for example on [3] and [10], I
wondered why systems as simple and clarifying as the logics articulated below
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had not been presented a long time ago.2 The reason is presumably that their
formulation presupposes familiarity with the adaptive logic programme. Yet,
the logics are extremely simple and extremely promising.
As announced, all relevant metatheoretic results are available elsewhere. The
aim of the present paper is to illustrate the variety of inductive methods that
may be characterized by adaptive logics, even if deductive logic is identified
with CL. So the paper is mainly an argument for the richness of the adaptive
approach, which had its effects on the bibliography. Comparison with other
approaches is not possible within the confines of the present paper. Other
approaches are so different that this comparison would require a separate paper.
2 Adaptive Logics
As there are many introductions to adaptive logics, for example [2] and [6], I
shall be as brief as possible. An adaptive logic, AL, in standard format is a
triple:
1. A lower limit logic LLL: a reflexive, transitive, monotonic, and compact
logic that has a characteristic semantics and containsCL (Classical Logic).
2. A set of abnormalities Ω : a set of LLL-contingent formulas, characterized
by a (possibly restricted) logical form F; or a union of such sets.
3. An adaptive strategy : Reliability or Minimal Abnormality.
The lower limit logic is the stable part of the adaptive logic; anything that
follows from the premises by LLL will never be revoked. The lower limit logic
is an extension of CL in that the standard language is extended with all clas-
sical symbols (noted with a check: ¬ˇ, ∨ˇ, . . . , ∃ˇ, =ˇ). The classical symbols
do not occur in the premises or in the conclusion; they serve a technical and
metatheoretical function. Abnormalities are supposed to be false, ‘unless and
until proven otherwise’. Strategies are ways to cope with derivable disjunctions
of abnormalities: an adaptive strategy picks one specific way to interpret the
premises as normally as possible.3
If the lower limit logic is extended with an axiom that declares all abnor-
malities logically false, one obtains the upper limit logic ULL. If a premise set
Γ does not require that any abnormalities are true, the AL-consequences of Γ
are identical to its ULL-consequences.
In the expression Dab(∆), ∆ is a finite subset of Ω and Dab(∆) denotes
the classical disjunction of the members of ∆. Dab(∆) is called a Dab-formula.
Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ `LLL Dab(∆) whereas Γ 0LLL
Dab(∆′) for any ∆′ ⊂ ∆. Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal
Dab-consequences of Γ, U(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 ∪ . . . The set U(Γ) comprises the
2In the form of a formal logic, that is. There are connections with Mill’s canons. There
are also connections with Reichenbach’s straight rule, if restricted to general hypotheses, and
with Popper’s conjectures and refutations. Articulating the formal logic drastically increases
precision, as we shall see.
3Reliability and Minimal Abnormality are the official strategies of the standard format.
Most other strategies were developed to characterize consequence relations from the literature
in terms of an adaptive logic. All those strategies can be reduced to Reliability or Minimal
Abnormality under a translation.
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abnormalities that are unreliable with respect to Γ. Where M is a LLL-model,
Ab(M) is the set of abnormalities verified by M .
Definition 2.1 A LLL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
Definition 2.2 Γ ALr A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
Definition 2.3 A LLL-model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no
LLL-model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 2.4 Γ ALm A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models
of Γ.
The two strategies are not as different as the above treatment may suggest.
A choice set of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .} is a set that contains an element out of each
member of Σ. A minimal choice set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper
subset is a choice set of Σ. Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal Dab-
consequences of Γ, Φ(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .}.
It can be shown that a LLL-model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff Ab(M) ∈
Φ(Γ).
Apart from a semantics, adaptive logics have a dynamic proof theory—see
for example [8] for some theory. An annotated AL-proof consists of lines that
have four elements: a line number, a formula, a justification (at most referring
to preceding lines) and a condition. Where
A ∆
abbreviates that A occurs in the proof as the formula of a line that has ∆ as its
condition, the (generic) inference rules are:
PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `LLL B: A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `LLL B ∨ˇ Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
A stage of a proof is a list of lines obtained by applications of the three above
rules. The empty list will be considered as stage 0 of every proof. Where s is a
stage, s′ is an extension of s iff all lines that occur in s occur in the same order
in s′. A (dynamic) proof is a chain of stages. Here comes a peculiarity required
by the Minimal Abnormality strategy. Normally, the extension of a stage is
obtained by appending lines. This is not required here. The added lines may
be inserted, provided that the justification of every line refers only to preceding
lines. A line inserted between lines 4 and 5 may, for example, be numbered 4.1
(or the lines may be renumbered).
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That A is derivable on the condition ∆ may be interpreted as follows: it
follows from the premise set that A or one of the members of ∆ is true. As the
members of ∆, which are abnormalities, are supposed to be false, A is considered
as derived, unless and until it shows that the supposition cannot be upheld.
The precise meaning of “cannot be upheld” depends on the strategy, which
determines the marking definition (see below) and hence determines which lines
are marked at a stage. If a line is marked at a stage, its formula is considered
as not derived at that stage.
Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s of an AL-proof iff Dab(∆) has
been derived at that stage on the condition ∅ whereas there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ for
which Dab(∆′) has been derived on the condition ∅. Where Dab(∆1), . . . , Dab(∆n)
are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s of a proof from Γ, Us(Γ) = ∆1∪. . .∪∆n
and Φs(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆1, . . . ,∆n}.
Definition 2.5 Marking for Reliability: Line l is marked at stage s iff, where
∆ is its condition, ∆ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
Definition 2.6 Marking for Minimal Abnormality: Line l is marked at stage s
iff, where A is derived on the condition ∆ on line l, (i) there is no ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ)
such that ϕ∩∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line on which A is
derived on a condition Θ for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
This reads more easily: where A is derived on the condition ∆ on line l, line
l is unmarked at stage s iff (i) there is a ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ) for which ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and
(ii) for every ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is a line at which A is derived on a condition Θ
for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
A formula A is derived at stage s of a proof from Γ iff it is the formula of
a line that is unmarked at that stage. Marks may come and go as the proof
proceeds. So one also wants to define a stable notion of derivability, which is
called final derivability.
Definition 2.7 A is finally derived from Γ on line l of a stage s iff (i) A is
the second element of line l, (ii) line l is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every
extension of the stage in which line l is marked may be further extended in such
a way that line l is unmarked.
Definition 2.8 Γ `AL A (A is finally AL-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally
derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
In Definition 2.7, s may be taken to be a finite stage for both strategies. For
the Reliability strategy, the definition may moreover be taken to refer to finite
extensions only. For Minimal Abnormality the definition should be required to
refer to finite as well as to infinite extensions, as was shown in [1, p. 479].
An intuitive notion behind final derivability is the existence of a proof that
is stable with respect to an unmarked line l: A is derived on line l and line l
is unmarked in the proof and in all its extensions. However, for some AL, Γ,
and A, only an infinite proof from Γ in which A is the formula of a line l is
stable with respect to line l. Definition 2.7 has an attractive game-theoretic
interpretation—see especially [8].
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3 Mere Falsification
A generalization is compatible with a set of data just in case the data do not
falsify it. Let us try out that crude idea, which agrees with the hypothetico-
deductive approach.
The generalizations that are inductively derived from a set of data should
be jointly compatible with the data. The logic of compatibility—see [11]—
provides us with the set of all statements compatible with Γ. However, to select
a set of jointly compatible statements in a justified way seems hopeless. For
any statement A that does not deductively follow from the premises, there is
a set of statements ∆ such that the members of ∆ are jointly compatible with
the premises whereas the members of ∆ ∪ {A} are not. However, it turns out
possible to use joint compatibility as a criterion provided one considers only
generalizations as restricted in Section 1.
So while the unconditional rule will take care of CL-consequences, the con-
ditional rule will allow one to introduce a generalization on a condition, which
will be (the singleton comprising) the negation of the generalization. In other
words, the abnormalities are negations of generalizations. Why are negations of
generalizations called abnormalities? There is on the one hand a technical jus-
tification for doing so: they allow us to derive the right generalizations. There
is also a philosophical justification: in the present context, negations of gener-
alizations are considered as false until and unless proven otherwise, viz. until
an unless the generalization is falsified. There is also a different philosophical
justification. Induction is connected to the presupposition that the world is as
uniform as allowed by the data—see already [13]. The negation of a generaliza-
tion expresses a lack of uniformity.
Let us call this adaptive logic LIr if Reliability is chosen as the strategy.
Here is the start of a very simple proof from Γ1 = {(Pa ∧ Pb) ∧ Pc,Rb ∨
¬Qb,Rb ⊃ ¬Pb, (Sa ∧ Sb) ∧Qa}. Some CL-consequences are derived and two
generalizations are introduced.
1 (Pa ∧ Pb) ∧ Pc premise ∅
2 Rb ∨ ¬Qb premise ∅
3 Rb ⊃ ¬Pb premise ∅
4 (Sa ∧ Sb) ∧Qa premise ∅
5 Pa 1; RU ∅
6 Pb 1; RU ∅
7 Qa 4; RU ∅
8 Sa 4; RU ∅
9 Sb 4; RU ∅
10 ∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) RC {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx)}
11 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) RC {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)}
The two generalizations are considered as ‘conditionally’ true, as true until
falsified. The sole member of {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx)} has to be false in order for
∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) to be derivable and similarly for line 11. Conditionally derived
formulas may obviously be combined by RU. Here is an example:
12 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Qx ∧ Sx)) 10, 11; RU {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx),¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)}
The interpretation of the condition of line 12 is obviously that ∀x(Px ⊃
(Qx∧ Sx)) should be considered as not derived if ¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) or ¬∀x(Px ⊃
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Qx) turns out to be true. Actually, it is not difficult to see that ¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)
is indeed derivable from the premises.
13 ¬Rb 3, 6; RU ∅
14 ¬Qb 2, 13; RU ∅
15 ¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) 6, 14; RU ∅
So lines 11 and 12 have to be marked and their formulas are considered as
not inductively derived from the premises. I repeat lines 10–15 with the correct
marks at stage 15:
10 ∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) RC {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx)}
11 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) RC {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)} X15
12 ∀x(Px ⊃ (Qx ∧ Sx)) 10, 11; RU {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx),¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx)} X15
13 ¬Rb 3, 6; RU ∅
14 ¬Qb 2, 13; RU ∅
15 ¬∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) 6, 14; RU ∅
Derived generalizations obviously entail predictions by RU, as in line 17.
16 Pc 1; RU ∅
17 Sc 16, 10; RU {¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx)}
At this point I have to report about a fascinating phenomenon. Although we
started from a simple hypothetico-deductive approach, based on falsification, it
turns out that some abnormalities are connected. Not only falsification, but also
the connection between abnormalities, which comes to joint falsification, will
prevent certain generalizations from being adaptively derivable. I now illustrate
this. In the atoms derived so far, there are objects known to be P , but none
known to be ¬P , and objects known to be ¬R, but none known to be R. So
it seems attractive to introduce two generalizations expressing this. I shall first
present the extension of the proof and then comment upon it.
18 ∀xPx RC {¬∀xPx}
19 ∀x¬Rx RC {¬∀x¬Rx} X22
20 Ra ∨ ¬Ra RU ∅
21 Ra ∨ (Qa ∧ ¬Ra) 20, 7; RU ∅
22 ¬∀x¬Rx ∨ ¬∀x(Qx ⊃ Rx) 21; RU ∅
The formula unconditionally derived at line 22 is a minimal Dab-formula at
stage 22 (and actually also a minimal Dab-consequence of the premise set). So
line 19 is marked at this stage and is actually marked in every extension of the
stage. The generalization ∀xPx, derived at line 18, is finally derived. There is
no minimal Dab-consequence of the premises of which ¬∀xPx is a disjunct.
The phenomenon is fascinating because the adaptive approach reveals that
connected abnormalities prevent one from deriving the related generalizations.
Although we started from a hypothetico-deductive approach that deems a gen-
eralization non-derivable in case it is falsified, we arrived at the insight that a
generalization may not be derivable because it belongs to a minimal (finite) set
of generalizations one of which is bound to be falsified by the data. I don’t think
this insight is very deep. Yet, much of the literature that sees the derivation of
generalizations along these lines, simply missed this point.
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This deserves a further comment. Apparently joint compatibility is not seen
as a suitable means to distinguish between generalizations that may sensibly be
derived from a set of data and those that may not sensibly be so derived. The
reason is obviously that every generalization belongs to a set of generalizations
that is incompatible with the data. However, LIr solves this predicament. It
allows one to derive the generalizations that do not belong to a minimal set
of generalizations that are jointly incompatible with the data. For this reason
∀x¬Rx is not derivable from the considered data, but ∀xPx is. Indeed, ¬∀xPx
is not a disjunct of a minimal Dab-consequence of the data—note that a Dab-
formula is equivalent to the negation of a conjunction of generalizations. It is
precisely by invoking minimality that the above criterion is made to do its job.4
So, as I suggested, the adaptive approach gets it right from the beginning.
The role of connected abnormalities may also be illustrated by considering
a predicate that does not occur in the premises. T is such a predicate, and one
might introduce ∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx) to see what becomes of it. Not much, as the
following extension of the proof shows.
23 ∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx) RC {¬∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx)} X25
24 ∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx) RC {¬∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx)} X25
25 ¬∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx) ∨ ¬∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx) 7; RU ∅
Obviously, the premises 1–4 do not contradict ∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx). However, they
contradict ∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx)∧∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx), which is noted on line 25 and causes
lines 23 and 24 to be marked. Incidentally, suppose that the marking definition
would causes a line to be marked only if an element of its condition is derived
unconditionally. On such a definition, lines 23 and 24 would both be unmarked
and so would be a line at which we would derive Ta ∧ ¬Ta from 1, 23, and 24.
So triviality would result.
Allow me to insert a short intermission at this point. By applying RU, viz.
Addition, one may derive
∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx) ∨ ∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx)
on two different conditions: from line 23 on the condition {¬∀x(Qx ⊃ Tx)} and
from line 24 on the condition {¬∀x(Qx ⊃ ¬Tx)}. The two lines on which the
disjunction would be so derived would still be marked on the Reliability strategy.
However, once both occur, they are unmarked if Minimal Abnormality is the
strategy, so for the logic LIm . This illustrates that Minimal Abnormality leads
to some more consequences than Reliability.
At this point, I can also clarify some of the restrictions on generalizations—
these are actually introduced by restrictions on the abnormalities. Suppose
that one allowed to introduce the generalization ∀x((Qx∨¬Qx) ⊃ ¬Sc) on the
condition {¬∀x((Qx∨¬Qx) ⊃ ¬Sc)} in the preceding proof. From line 1 follows
¬∀x(Px ⊃ Sx) ∨ ¬∀x((Qx ∨ ¬Qx) ⊃ ¬Sc)
by RU. This would cause the line on which ∀x((Qx ∨ ¬Qx) ⊃ ¬Sc) is derived
to be marked. However, it would also cause line 10 to be marked. It is not
4The compactness of CL warrants that every minimal set of formulas (any formulas that
is), the members of which are jointly incompatible with a premise set (any premise set), is
finite.
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difficult to see that, by allowing such ‘generalizations’, no formula derived on a
non-empty condition would be finally derived. Similar troubles arise if it were
allowed to introduce such hypotheses as ∀x((Qx ∨ ¬Qx) ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∧ ¬Sy)).
Before leaving the matter, let me add two comments on the logics LIr and
LIm . First, formulating their semantics is obvious in view of Section 2. The
second comment is that some readers may argue that the dynamics of the proofs
may be avoided in view of the restrictions on the premises and on the conclu-
sions. This is correct. However, the resulting proofs are not the usual static
proofs of Tarski logics, but a complication of dynamic proofs. More impor-
tantly, the present logic is a very restricted one. For example, it does not take
background knowledge into account. As soon as some of the restrictions are
eliminated, we obtain a consequence relation for which there is no positive test
and which requires dynamic proofs.
4 Two Stronger Alternatives
If uniformity is identified with the truth of every generalization, as in LIr and
LIm , no possible world is completely uniform. Uniformity may be interpreted
differently: a completely uniform world is one in which all objects have the
same properties. Put differently, if something has a property, then everything
has this property. So ∃xPx ⊃ ∀xPx and, in general, ∃A ⊃ ∀A in which A is
a disjunction of members of Af1. Some worlds are completely uniform in this
sense, although not our world.
The adaptive logics based on this idea will be called ILr and ILm . An
abnormality, viz. a formula expressing a lack of uniformity, states that something
has a property and something else does not. It is a formula of the form ∃(A1 ∨
. . . ∨ An) ∧ ∃¬(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) for A1, . . . , An ∈ Af1 and n ≥ 1. Here is a little
proof from {Pa}.
1 Pa premise ∅
2 ∀xPx 1; RC {∃Px ∧ ∃¬Px}
Several simple but interesting observations may be made. From the premise
Pa, ∃xPx is CL-derivable. As ∀xPx∨∃x¬Px is a CL-theorem, either ∀xPx is
true or the abnormality ∃Px∧∃¬Px is true. In other words, if one presupposes
abnormalities to be false unless and until proven otherwise, one may derive
∀xPx from Pa, unless and until some object is shown not to have the property
P . Next, if Pa is a premise, ∃Px∧∃¬Px is false just in case ∃¬Px is false, and
this formula is CL-equivalent to the negation of ∀xPx. This provides a nice
way to compare ILr with LIr . The logic LIr enables one to introduce ∀xPx on
the condition {¬∀xPx} because ∀xPx ∨ ¬∀xPx is a CL-theorem. ILr seems
more demanding. In order to introduce ∀xPx, one needs an instance of it, or at
least ∃xPx. This seems a natural requirement; one does not want to introduce
a generalization unless one knows that it has at least one instance.
While ILr is very close to LIr , it is also richer than LIr . This is easily seen
if the previous proof is continued as follows—!A abbreviates ∃A∧∃¬A to fit the
proof on the page.
3 (Pa ⊃ Qa) ∨ (Pa ⊃ ¬Qa) 1; RU ∅
4 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) ∨ ∀x(Px ⊃ ¬Qx) 3; RC {!(¬Px ∨Qx), !(¬Px ∨ ¬Qx)}
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Although we do now know anything about the Q-hood of objects that are
P , we are presupposing uniformity. So we presuppose that the objects that are
P are either all Q or all not Q. In view of this, it is desirable that ∀x(Px ⊃
Qx) ∨ ∀x(Px ⊃ ¬Qx) is finally derivable from {Pa}. And indeed it is. As the
premise set is normal (with respect to ILr ), no abnormality is CL-derivable
from it and line 4 will not be marked in any extension of the proof. This is
a gain over LIr . In a LIr -proof from {Pa}, the (reformulated) condition of
line 4 is {∃x¬(¬Px ∨ Qx),∃x¬(¬Px ∨ ¬Qx)} and the disjunction of the two
members of the condition is CL-derivable from Pa, whence line 4 is marked in
the LIr -proof.
The logic ILr is also richer than LIr in other respects. Here is a nice example,
provided to me by Mathieu Beirlaen. Consider Γ2 = {Pa,¬Pb ∨ Qb}. In LIr
no generalization is derivable from Γ2. Indeed, Pa entails the abnormality
¬∀x¬Px. The second premise informs one that either the abnormality ¬∀xPx
or ¬∀x¬Qx obtains. Note that both choices are on a par. The proof goes as
follows.
1 Pa premise ∅
2 ¬Pb ∨Qb premise ∅
3 ∀xPx 1; RC {¬∀xPx} X4
4 ¬∀xPx ∨ ¬∀x¬Qx 1, 2; RU ∅
So line 3 is marked in every extension of the proof from Γ because ∃x¬Px ∈
Us(Γ2). The situation in ILr is completely different.
1 Pa premise ∅
2 ¬Pb ∨Qb premise ∅
3 ∀xPx 1; RC {∃xPx ∧ ∃x¬Px}
4 ∀xQx 3, 2; RC {∃xPx ∧ ∃x¬Px,∃x¬Qx ∧ ∃x¬¬Qx}
With respect to ILr , Γ2 is normal (no Dab-formula is derivable from it). So
both lines 3 and 4 are unmarked in all extensions of the proof.
The variant ILm is similar except that it has Minimal Abnormality as its
strategy and is slightly stronger than ILr .
Consider ILr -proof from Γ3 = {Pa,Qa,¬Qb,¬Pc}.
1 Pa premise ∅
2 Qa premise ∅
3 ¬Qb premise ∅
4 ¬Pc premise ∅
5 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) 2; RC {!(¬Px ∨Qx)} X7
6 (Pb ∧ ¬Qb) ∨ (¬Pb ∧ ¬Qb) 3; RU ∅
7 !(¬Px ∨Qx)∨!(Px ∨Qx) 2, 6; RC ∅
As Γ3 0CL!(Px ∨ Qx), line 5 is marked in all extensions of the proof. Even
ILm assigns only some disjuncts of generalizations as final consequences to Γ3.
Presumably some would like to derive ∀x(Px ≡ Qx) from it. This does not
follow by ILr , but it follows if we slightly modify the adaptive logic.
The instances that are required to occur in the ILm -abnormalities are in-
stances in the sense in which logicians use the term, for example Pd ⊃ Qd is
an instance of Px ⊃ Qx. When philosophers of science talk about inductive
generalization, they use the phrases positive instance and negative instance. By
10
a positive instance of ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) they mean an instance of Px ∧ Qx and
by a negative instance of ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) they mean an instance of Px ∧ ¬Qx.
This suggests that we consider adaptive logics that have such abnormalities as
∃x(Px∧Qx)∧∃x(Px∧¬Qx)—in words: there is a positive as well as a negative
instance of ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx).
One way to do this systematically is by defining the set of abnormalities as
{∃(A1∧ . . .∧An∧A0)∧∃(A1∧ . . .∧An∧¬A0) | A0, A1, . . . , An ∈ Af1;n ≥ 0}—if
n = 0, the formula reduces to ∃A0 ∧ ∃¬A0. As the abnormalities are long, I
shall abbreviate ∃(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ A0) ∧ ∃(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ ¬A0) in proofs as
A1 ∧ . . . ∧An ∧ ±A0.5
This approach is sufficiently general because every generalization, as re-
stricted in Section 1, is CL-equivalent to a conjunction of formulas of the form
∀((A1 ∧ . . .∧An) ⊃ A0) in which the metavariables denote members of Af1. So
a generalization G will be derivable just in case the formulas are derivable that
have the specified form and areCL-entailed by G. This is precisely as we want it.
Note that ∀((A1∧. . .∧An) ⊃ A0) is equivalent to ∀(¬A1∨. . .∨¬An∨A0) and that
the n+ 1 abnormalities correspond to this formula. Example: ∀x((Px ∧Qx) ⊃
Rx), ∀x((Px ∧ ¬Rx) ⊃ ¬Qx), and ∀x((¬Rx ∧ Qx) ⊃ ¬Px) are equivalent
but generate three different abnormalities—only their first conjunct is non-
equivalent. In other words, the generalization ∀x(¬Px ∨ ¬Qx ∨ Rx) can be
derived on three different conditions.
Let us call the so obtained logics Gr and Gm . Their lower limit is obviously
CL, their set of abnormalities is the one defined two paragraphs ago, and their
strategies are respectively Reliability and Minimal Abnormality. Let us now
return to the premise set Γ3. I skip the premises in the following proof.
5 ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) 1, 2; RC {Px ∧ ±Qx}
6 ∀x(Qx ⊃ Px) 1, 2; RC {Qx ∧ ±Px}
7 ∀x(Qx ≡ Px) 5, 6; RU {Px ∧ ±Qx,Qx ∧ ±Px}
Line 5 will not be marked in any extension of this proof because the only minimal
Dab-consequences of Γ3 are ∃xPx∧∃x¬Px and ∃xQx∧∃x¬Qx. Obviously the
proof is also a correct Gm -proof and no line is marked in it or will be marked
in any extension.
The reader may think that ∀xQx ∨ ∀x¬Qx is a final Gr -consequence of
{Pa,¬Pb}. This is mistaken because these premises CL-entail the Dab-formula
±Qx ∨ (Qx ∧ ±Px) ∨ (¬Qx ∧ ±Px). This brings us right to the topic of the
following section.
5 Combined Adaptive Logics
As spelling out the proof theory would lead us too far, I shall define the combined
adaptive logics in terms of the consequence sets of simple (that is, uncombined)
adaptive logics. The combined logics rely on the Popperian idea that more
general hypotheses should be given precedence over less general ones. So if
∀xPx and ∀x(Qx ⊃ Rx) are jointly incompatible with the data, the combined
logics will (given the right circumstances) deliver ∀xPx as a consequence.
5The definition of the abnormalities does not require that the Ai are different from each
other, and indeed there is no need to require so.
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For each logic from the previous section, we first split the sets of abnormality,
Ω, into subsets of different degrees. The degree of an abnormality is one less
than the number of atoms that occur in (one conjunct of) it. Thus the degree
of the G-abnormality ∃x(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ A0) ∧ ∃x(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ ¬A0) is n.
Splitting Ω thus, we obtain sets Ω0,Ω1, . . .. Next we define, for each i ≥ 0,
Ω(i) = Ω0 ∪ Ω1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ωi. Finally, we define, for each of the logics from the
previous section, an infinity of logics which are just like the original, except
that their set of abnormalities is Ωi, respectively Ω(i). This gives us logics
called LIri , LI
m
i , LI
r
(i), LI
m
(i), IL
r
i , and so on. From these logics, the combined
adaptive logics are defined. Let us start with the H-group, the H referring to
the hierarchical character of the logic.
CnHLIr (Γ) = CnCL(CnLIr(0)(Γ) ∪ CnLIr(1)(Γ) ∪ . . .) (1)
The definitions for the IL-family and the G-family are similar—replace “LI”
by “IL”, respectively “G” in (1). For the logics that follow the Minimal Ab-
normality strategy, replace the superscript r by m everywhere. Note that the
definiens is a union of consequence sets closed under the lower limit logic CL.
Some readers might get scared by (1). The logic HLIr is defined in terms
of an infinity of logics. This, however, is not a problem. It is not a theoretical
problem because all those logics are well-defined and so is HLIr . It is not a
practical problem either because the premise sets to which we want to apply
HLIr is forcibly a finite set of singular data and people applying HLIr will
only be interested in hypotheses built from predicates that occur in the data.
So every application will require that at most a finite number of LIr(i) logics are
invoked.
Next, we come to the C-group.
CnCLIr (Γ) = . . . (CnLIr(2)(CnLIr(1)(CnLIr(0)(Γ)))) . . . (2)
Here we have a superposition of consequence sets. This means that the Dab-
formulas of level 1 are defined in terms of CnLIr(0)(Γ) and not in terms of Γ.
Applying the same type of combination to the IL-family and to the G-family is
an obvious task, and so is defining the corresponding logics that have Minimal
Abnormality as their strategy.
Finally, here is the definition of a logic from the S-group.
CnSLIr (Γ) = . . . (CnLIr2(CnLIr1(CnLIr0(Γ)))) . . . (3)
The basic difference with the C-group is that the sets of abnormalities are kept
apart. In other words, if an abnormality of level n is not unreliable, then it
cannot be unreliable at any higher level.
It is provable for each of the combined logics that the consequence set of
Γ is non-trivial whenever Γ is not inconsistent. The proof theory of the com-
bined logics is not spelled out here, but its fascinating feature is that it is not
more complex than the proof theory of the simple logics. This holds for the
construction of proofs as well as for the criteria that warrant final derivability.
All aforementioned logics are listed in the following table.
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LI-family IL-family G-family
simple LIr LIm ILr ILm Gr Gm
H-group HLIr HLIm HILr HILm HGr HGm
C-group CLIr CLIm CILr CILm CGr CGm
S-group SLIr SLIm SILr SILm SGr SGm
6 Making it More Realistic
Two features that make the enterprise more realistic will be discussed: tak-
ing background knowledge into account and allowing the researcher to launch
conjectures that are not justified by logical considerations. I shall also briefly
comment upon the research-guiding aspects of the logics.
The easiest way to handle background knowledge is by adding it to the
available data, in other words to the premise set. Three problems lurk around
the corner though. The first is that separate pieces of the background knowledge
may be inconsistent, the second that pieces of background knowledge may be
jointly inconsistent, the third that background knowledge may be falsified by
the data. As this paper is written from a classical outlook, I shall disregard the
first problem. The third problem obviously cannot be neglected even within a
fully classical framework—no classical logician would locate anything deviant in
Popper’s work. The trouble is that Popper’s advice to discard falsified theories
is too simple. For more than thirty years—I mean [15]—everyone who can
read and has access to the literature should know that scientists often continue
to reason from falsified theories. They typically consider the falsifications as
problems but keep relying on other consequences of the falsified theory. In
other words, discarding falsified theories is not always a good advice because it
would leave one without any information about the domain. The third problem
will turn out to be solved by the way in which I shall handle falsification.
If falsification occurs, two cases need to be distinguished: the one in which
we discard a falsified theory altogether and the one in which we only discard
the falsified consequences of the theory. Note that a falsification may only
be discovered after some reasoning. So we are in defeasible waters here. A
further distinction has to be made. Part of our background knowledge consists
of separate statements whereas other parts are theories—for present purposes,
any non-singleton set of statements will be considered to be a theory.
The picture is not complete yet. That the data falsify a piece of background
knowledge is the simple case. More often, however, the data falsify a set of
background knowledge without falsifying any single theory or any single separate
statement in the set. In such cases, it is important to take into account that
elements of our background knowledge may differ in plausibility. One will reject
the piece of background knowledge that is least plausible anyway. So we need
plausibilities or priorities or preferences. Incidentally, this makes the matter
even more defeasible.
Here is a way to handle all this adaptively. Let both ♦ and  be defined
as K-possibility;6 they have the same meaning, but behave differently in the
adaptive logic. Let ♦i denote a sequence of i symbols ♦ and similarly for i.
6I refer to a predicative version of K, spelled out in [9] but easily reconstructed from, for
example [12] or [4].
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Next, define, for every i ≥ 1,
Ωi = {∃(♦iA ∧ ¬A) | A ∈ A} ∪ {∃(iB ∧ ¬B) | B ∈ W} ,
in which A is the set of atoms (primitive formulas and their negations) and W
the set of closed formulas. For every i ≥ 1, define the adaptive logic Kri as the
triple composed of (i) K, (ii) Ωi, and (iii) Reliability. Finally, define a combined
adaptive logic
CnKr (Γ) = . . . (CnKr3(CnKr2(CnKr1(Γ)))) . . . (4)
and define the combined logic Km analogously.
This framework enables us to express the prioritized background knowledge
in the object language. If, in the case of falsification, a piece of background
knowledge A is to be discarded altogether, it is introduced in the premise set as
iA, in which i is smaller as A’s priority is higher. If, in the case of falsification,
only the falsified consequences of A have to be discarded, the piece of background
knowledge A is introduced in the premise set as ♦iA. In the case of a theory,
every conjunction A of finitely many ‘axioms’ of the theory is so introduced as
a premise.
Applying Kr or Km to the premise set, which now comprises the data as well
as the prioritized background knowledge, will have the desired effect. If a piece of
background knowledge A is falsified by the data, it is discarded in case it occurs
in the premises as iA, for some i, and its falsified consequences are discarded
in case it occurs in the premises as ♦iA. Pieces of background knowledge, or
consequences of them, that are not discarded are retained as a non-prioritized
statements. The proof theory is very simple in this respect. From ♦iA follows
A ∨ (¬A ∧ ♦iA) by CL. So if ♦iA occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, A
may be derived from it on the condition ∆ ∪ {¬A ∧ ♦iA}. Moreover, all this
proceeds in a prioritized way, as appears from (4). So a piece of background
knowledge of priority i will be ‘judged’ by the data together with the retained
pieces of background knowledge with priority j < i. The consequences obtained
by Kr or Km from the premises will then function as the premises of a logic
of inductive generalization. If the latter is combined itself, this may look like
a lot of combinations. So I better repeat that the proofs of such combinations
are not more complex in principle than the proofs of simple adaptive logics. It
is moreover worth spelling out that, in the dynamic proofs, all simple adaptive
logics that play a role in the combination may be applied in any order. The
effect of the combination is taken care of by the marking definition: marking
proceeds in view of the different combining logics in a certain order.
The second aspect in which the procedure should be made more realistic is
by allowing the researcher to introduce conjectures. Ampliative consequences
derived by a logic of inductive generalization are justified in view of a logical
rationale, which is slightly different for every such logic. This rationale is fixed by
the choice of the abnormalities and possibly by ordering them in several sets and
by the role these sets play in the combined logic. The derived generalizations
are conjectures in the sense that the logical rationale is not deduction—the
generalizations may be overruled by future data, the logic is defeasible. There
is, however, a very different kind of conjectures, viz. those for which there is at
best a non-logical justification.
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Suppose that, at some stage of a proof, A∨B ∨C is a minimal Dab-formula
(at that stage), with A, B, and C abnormalities of the right kind. Each of the
three abnormalities may prevent certain generalizations from being derivable.
At this point, the researcher may have a good reason to introduce ¬A as a
new premise. In doing so, the Dab-formula is reduced to B ∨ C and more
generalizations become derivable.
Obviously, A may turn out to be derivable from the data after all, or may
be derivable when new data are obtained. So ¬A should not be introduced as
a certainty, but as a statement that is assigned a certain plausibility but may
be defeated by future experience. The technical handling of this is obvious. We
just introduce ¬A with the required priority. In other words we introduce the
premise i¬A, or ♦i¬A, with the suitable i and handle it in the same way as
we handled a piece of background knowledge. So we do not need any new logic
in this connection.7
My last point for this section is that all logics of inductive generalization have
a strong research guiding flavour. Consider again the case where A∨B ∨C is a
minimal Dab-formula at that the present stage. As we learn from Wi´sniewski’s
erotetic logic, see for example [16, 17], the disjunction A ∨ B ∨ C invokes the
question ?{A,B,C}, in words: Which of A, B, and C is the case? A full answer
to this question might be A (or B or C), but even ¬A (or ¬B or ¬C) would
partially answer the question in that it reduces the question to a simpler one.8
Note that the full answer A frees both B and C, at least as far as the present
Dab-formula is concerned. Obtaining the answer A will have the effect that
certain generalizations, the derivation of which was blocked by B or C, will
become derivable. Note that, in the present context, A is obtained by new
experience which will falsify a certain generalization. The extended experience
will provide a logical reason to derive further generalizations. Note that, here
too, mere conjectures may interfere to suggest more specific research.
7 In Conclusion
Quite some ground was covered. For some parts, I had to refer to other papers.
It is to be hoped that this paper will attract other researchers to continue the
quest, either within the adaptive logic program or within a different one. In this
way and by interaction with philosophers of science, we will eventually arrive at
set of methodological theories that are formulated in a precise way and precisely
for this reason may be subjected to criticism.
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